-Socio-Economics or Social Economics whose crucial elements (as described by Davis and Dolfsma 2008) are an emphasis on social values (in particular ethics, equity, power, human dignity) and social relationships (in particular embeddedness); -New Institutional Economics represented by agency, transaction costs, and property rights theory; and -Psychological Economics (often called Behavioural Economics 2 ) which widens the neoclassical homo oeconomicus by considering insights gained from psychology (and sometimes sociology).
The present author considers himself a (benevolent) outsider to Social Economics. Actually, he is one of the "New Social Economists" (Davis and Dolfsma 2008:4-5) or, less nicely, "Economic Imperialists" who finds it fruitful to apply (neoclassical) economic thinking to the environment, politics, history, the arts, terrorism and happiness. At the same time he strongly believes that the standard homo oeconomicus needs to be improved by considering institutions and psychological and sociological insights.
This paper advances two arguments:
-An extension of Neoclassical Economics with elements from other social sciences (including political science, sociology, psychology, law and anthropology) is fruitful to explain institutions because it allows us to maintain the strength of that approach:
Neoclassics is based on clear concepts, strives to be as simple as possible, and makes an effort to derive theoretical hypotheses and to test them with empirical data from the field, natural and laboratory experiments. I find the assumption of exogenous and unchanging preferences to be good to discipline one's thinking -as long as one is prepared to deviate from it when needed.
-Social Economics can play an important role helping to overcome the limitations of Neoclassics when dealing with institutions. However, I wish to argue that Social Economics should change in order to be able to fulfil this role: it should become more concrete, integrate what is useful in Neoclassics, and should seriously engage in empirical research.
These arguments make clear that my position differs from Social Economics (as represented by most authors in the Compendium) which endeavours to go far beyond what is argued above. In particular, most Social Economists take Neoclassics to be a basically wrong view of the world, therefore want to discard it completely and endeavour to start from a radically "social" position 3 .
II. Explaining Institution
There 
III. Government
Public Choice, or the New Political Economy, is firmly grounded in Neoclassics 4 . Most importantly, the assumption that politicians are benevolent individuals is rejected. Instead they are taken to have the same selfish motives as all other individuals. The most important goal of all politicians is to stay in, or to come into, power which in a democracy means to be (re-)elected. The same selfish motives are taken to apply to public officials, in that literature normally called bureaucrats (e.g. Niskanen 1971 , Wintrobe 1996 
Politico-Economic Models
Politico-economic models 5 seek to theoretically and empirically capture the interdependence between the economy and the polity for the institution of representative democracy. The state of the economy, represented by per capita income, the rate of unemployment and the rate of inflation, systematically affects the popularity of the government as well as re-election. The politicians in power are well aware of this influence and in turn use the policy instruments at their disposal, in particular government expenditures and regulations, to affect the state of the economy. This interaction produces regular economic fluctuations within election periods, in most countries four years. This is noteworthy, as traditionally economics scholars assumed that governments want to reduce business cycles. Economists rooted in Keynesian thinking took it as evident that once politicians know how to effectively combat business fluctuations, they will indeed do it.
The business cycles produced in dictatorships are different. The persons or groups in power are little or not at all constrained by elections; the main danger of being toppled comes from the military and possibly other organized groups whose interests have therefore to be taken into account. Only rarely an uprising of the population is able to remove a dictator -as long as it is not supported by the military. A successful dictator therefore does not need to react much to the grievances of the population but has to make sure that the military keep supporting him. This is best done by a policy making it clear to the military that they run a great and deadly risk if they oppose the dictator. At the same time the dictator must offer them benefits making it attractive for them to keep supporting the dictator.
Politico-economic models have also been applied to the institution of direct democracy. In such a democracy (of which Switzerland is a living example) the politicians in power are almost always re-elected -but they nevertheless have little power because the important political issues are decided by referendum. The politicians' main task is to win such referenda by arguing with the population about the merits of a proposition, and also to keep the voters satisfied with the economic conditions. certainly does not provide a full account of how political institutions work. The personality of politicians (such as their "leadership" quality), the social relationships between them and other decision-makers (such as in an "old boys network", and more generally their embeddedness), cultural differences, and their ethical standards also matter. Social Economics rightly points out that such aspects are crucial to explain how politicians behave, in particular for politicians with a great "aura" such as Gandhi, Kennedy, Thatcher, Mandela or Obama. It may well be argued that such politicians do not enter politics to enjoy power but rather because they want to put their ideas into reality. But it is also clear that even such extraordinary politicians are bound by the need to be elected and re-elected. It would greatly add to our knowledge of political institutions if Social Economists not only stated the importance of such aspects but would also advance theoretical propositions open to empirical tests.
Reorganizing the State by New Federal Units
The question to what extent "economics is adequate to explain institutions" can also be discussed with respect to normative proposals of how to organize government (rather than the positive analysis as in the case of politico-economic models). An important topic is how centralized and decentralized a state should be. Neoclassical public finance ("Public Economics") has extensively discussed the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization; the arguments need not be repeated here (see e.g. Inman and Rubinfeld 1997). But it has made an important, and often only implicit, assumption, namely that each level of government (i.e.
the central state, the provinces and the communes) have exclusive authority over particular governmental functions.
A new approach 6 proposes quite different federal units having four essential characteristics.
The new federal units are called FOCJ in accordance to the four constituting elements: (1985) . Tullock (1994) pioneered a similar concept. Casella and Frey (1992) , Frey and Eichenberger (1999) . Vanberg (2000) , and Kyriacou (2006) The four elements of FOCJ are now discussed in some more detail.
Functions
A particular public service benefiting people living in a certain geographical area should also be financed by them, i.e. there should be no spill-overs. The various governmental units providing for different functions can cater for regional differences in the populations' preferences or, more precisely, to its demands. To minimize cost, these units have to exploit economies of scale in production. As the latter may strongly differ between functions (e.g., between schools, police, hospitals, power plants and defence), there is an additional reason for uni-functional (or few-functional) governmental units of different sizes, i.e. for "fiscal equivalence" (Olson 1969 , Oates 1972 . That the size of governmental units is endogenous constitutes an essential part of FOCJ. Individuals may choose freely whether they want to belong to a particular FOCUS, but then are subject to its authority and must pay the corresponding taxes. Some FOCJ may be nonvoluntary in the sense that the central government may regulate that everyone must belong to some FOCUS providing for a certain function, e.g., to a school-FOCUS, and must pay the corresponding taxes (an analogy here is health insurance, which in many countries is obligatory but where individuals are allowed to choose an insurance company).
FOCJ compare favourably with traditional forms of federalism. The governments have stronger incentives and possibilities to satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of individuals.
Due to the concentration on one functional area, the citizens of a particular FOCUS are better informed about its activity, and are in a better position to compare its performance to other governments. As many benefits and costs extend over a quite limited geographic area, FOCJ are often small. The exit option opened by the existence of overlapping jurisdictions is also an important means to make one's preferences known to governmental suppliers.
FOCJ are able to provide public services at low cost because they are formed in order to minimize inter-jurisdictional spill-overs and to exploit economies of scale. When the benefits of a specific activity indivisibly extend over large areas, and there are decreasing costs, the corresponding optimal FOCUS may cover many communities, several nations, or even continents. The threat of dissatisfied citizens or communities to exit a FOCUS provides governments with an incentive to take individual preferences into account and to provide the public services efficiently. FOCJ undermine the politicians' cartel (the formation of a selfserving "classe politique") to competent outsiders. While all-purpose jurisdictions attract persons with broad and non-specialized knowledge to become politicians, in FOCJ, persons with a well-grounded knowledge in a particular functional area (say education or water provision) are successful.
A federal web composed of FOCJ affects the role of the nation states. They lose functions they presently do not fulfil according to the population's preferences, or which they produce at higher cost than FOCJ. On the other hand, the scheme does not purport to do away with nations but allows for multi-national as well as small-scale alternatives where citizens desire them. Nation states subsist in so far as they provide functions efficiently according to the voters' preferences.
Up to this point the advantages of FOCJ have been emphasized. The proposal may also have major disadvantages relating to issues of major concern to Social Economics. 
IV. Cultural Venues
The second institution to be discussed has quite different features from the governmental institutions discussed in the previous section. Cultural venues are institutions catering to people's preferences for artistic experiences. In order to discuss again as concretely as possible how the various types of economics may deal with institutions, a particular topic is chosen: how various institutional types of museums affect the supply of artistic activities. It will again be apparent where the limits of Neoclassics are and where Social
Economics may play an important part.
There is an extensive neoclassical analysis applied to culture and the arts, called "Economics of the Arts" or "Cultural Economics" 7 . The managers of museums are assumed to be primarily concerned with their own interests. The directors' utility depends on their own income and the prestige they receive within their reference group, which consists mainly of art lovers and the international museum community. A second source of utility is derived from agreeable working conditions and job security. But museum managers are not free to simply pursue their own goals, because they face constraints on their actions. Differences in these institutionally determined restrictions explain the museum management's behaviour. The finances available are the most important constraint on the museum's management. Other constraints, such as limited space or legal and administrative burdens imposed by the bureaucracy or labour unions, can also weigh heavily.
The source of income differs considerably between museums. Some depend mostly on public grants, others rely exclusively on private money (donations and sponsorship, or income generated from entrance fees, shops and restaurants). In the following, three types of museums are distinguished: public, private and museums dependent on donations.
Public Museums
Directors of public museums rely on public grants. The government allocates them sufficient funds to cover the expenses considered necessary for fulfilling their tasks.
While they are expected to keep within the budget, if a deficit occurs, it will be covered by the public purse. This institutional setting provides little incentive to generate 7 A survey article is provided by Throsby (1994) . Books are Baumol and Bowen (1966) , Peacock (1993) , Benhamou (2000) , Throsby (2001) , Frey and Pommerehne (1989) , Frey (2004) and the collection of articles in Peacock (1998) , Rizzo and Towse (2002) , Towse (2003) , Ginsburgh and Throsby (2006) and Hutter and Throsby (2008).
additional income and to keep costs at a minimum. The directorate will not allocate energy and resources generating additional income, because any additional money goes back to the national treasury acting like an implicit tax of 100 percent on profits.
The museum managers therefore are free to emphasise non-commercial aspects. It can legitimise its activities by referring to intrinsic 'artistic', "cultural", or 'scientific' values.
This helps the museum directors to achieve their goals of gaining prestige in the museum world, enables highly rated exhibitions, and allows for pleasant working conditions.
From this institutional point of view, one would expect that:
! Public museums do not sell any paintings from their art collection because the income generated would be lost for them as it has to go to the treasury. Moreover, the museum activities become measurable in monetary units, which opens the museum managers to criticism from the outside (be it by politicians or public administrators).
! Exhibitions tend to be designed to please an insider group of art connoisseurs, including in particular other museum directors.
! Visitors' amenities in public museums are poorly developed. Little attention is paid to museum shops, restaurants and cafeterias.
Private Museums
Directors of private museums have a strong incentive to increase the income of the museum.
Their survival depends on sources of money like entrance fees, the restaurant, shop surpluses and additional money from sponsors and donors. If private museums generate a surplus, they are able to use it for future undertakings. As a result, it is to be expected that: 
Museum dependent on donations
In many countries, contributions to non-profit museums are deductible under the income tax rules for individuals and corporations. A lower marginal tax rate reduces the willingness to donate because the implicit cost of doing so rises. The tax-deductible status strongly affects the behaviour of museum managers. In particular, they have an incentive to avoid profits by charging low or 'social' prices which strengthens the legitimacy of tax-deductible status.
The directors devote much effort and skilled resources to make their museum attractive to prospective donors. As a result, donors directly and indirectly exercise some measure of control over the activities of museums: This discussion shows that an analysis of museums inspired by Neoclassics is able to derive testable hypotheses and empirically relevant results. Nevertheless, there is much scope for analyses taking into account the concerns for social values and social relationships emphasized by Social Economist. I see three areas in which they may be directly relevant:
(1) Few museum directors are mainly or even exclusively interested in their own utility.
The cultural world is characterized by persons with a strong intrinsic motivation, i.e.
with individuals who are fascinated by the work of collecting, saving and exhibiting artefacts and works of art. This intrinsic motivation may lead them to act at least partly in a pro-social way.
(2) People engaged in the arts often have strong political ideologies and see cultural policy affected by the distribution of power. They see it as one of their tasks to fight against what they see to be "the bourgeoisie". They therefore oppose many suggestions to raise efficiency made by Neoclassics because they (rightly or wrongly) believe that they violate the principles of equity. A case in point is raising entry prices often proposed by Neoclassics 8 . Such a policy may raise revenue as the price elasticity of demand has generally been estimated to be below one. But higher entry prices may conflict with equity and ethical principles, and may even affect human dignity, as the population's possibilities to partake in culture is affected.
(3) People working in the cultural sector are strongly embedded in a community. The
Neoclassical analysis of museums acknowledges that the reference group is important for museum directors but they are ill equipped to go any deeper.
It is left open who the reference group exactly is and how quickly the identification with the reference group changes when a person moves upward in his or her career.
V. Conclusion
I have argued that economics understood as Neoclassics has much to contribute to our understanding of institutions. I have tried to demonstrate such contributions for political economics (politico-economic models and a new type of federalism) and for the economics of art (for the case of museums). The adherence to clearly defined individual utility functions (selfishness and rationality) and clearly defined constraints allows researchers to derive propositions often successfully empirically tested. . While this is understandable, it robs Social Economics the chance to influence Neoclassical analysis -something I think is highly desirable.
